Raf al-Intiqad wa Daf al-Itirad ala Qawlihim al-Ayman Mabniyya ala al-Alfaz la ala al-Aghrad
- Author died
- 1252 AH
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- T Istanbul
Raf al-Intiqad wa Daf al-Itirad ala Qawlihim al-Ayman Mabniyya ala al-Alfaz la ala al-Aghrad (Arabic: رفع الانتقاض ودفع الاعتراض على قولهم الأيمان مبنية على الألفاظ لا على الأغراض, lit. 'Removing Invalidation and Repelling Objection Regarding Their Maxim: Oaths Are Built upon Expressions, Not Purposes') is a legal treatise on Hanafi jurisprudence by the Damascene jurist Ibn Abidin (1198–1252 AH / 1784–1836 CE) . It investigates the legal maxims governing oaths (ayman), specifically examining how oaths relate to spoken expressions, customary usage (urf), and the subjective intents or purposes (aghrad) of the one taking the oath .
Background and Core Thesis
The treatise addresses a recognized complexity in Hanafi jurisprudence concerning two seemingly conflicting maxims: "Oaths are built upon expressions, not purposes" (al-ayman mabniyya ala al-alfaz la ala al-aghrad) and "Oaths are built upon custom" (al-ayman mabniyya ala al-urf) . To demonstrate the difficulty of the topic, Ibn Abidin quotes reports recorded by Jamal al-Din al-Hasiri from early authorities such as al-Qadi al-Sijzi and Abu al-Hasan al-Karkhi, noting that al-Karkhi once abandoned a teaching session after successive attempts to derive a uniform rule for oaths in bargaining were repeatedly invalidated by counterexamples .
Ibn Abidin argues that both maxims qualify one another: custom in oaths refers to the customary meaning derived directly from the expression itself, while expressions are interpreted according to customary convention (al-haqiqa al-istilahiyya), which takes precedence over strict literal linguistic definitions (al-haqiqa al-lughawiyya) . External subjective purposes not indicated by the wording cannot serve as the basis for legal liability in oaths .
Contents and Analysis
The author analyzes the underlying intent of an oath into three broad categories: where the purpose is the named act itself (such as swearing not to enter a house), where the purpose is the named act combined with an additional circumstance (such as swearing not to purchase an item for ten coins, meaning neither for ten nor for a higher price), or where the purpose is an external matter entirely distinct from the literal expression (such as swearing "I will not set foot in so-and-so's house," where the actual aim is entering rather than literally placing a foot) .
Based on this division, Ibn Abidin delineates four distinct scenarios concerning the action and the purpose :
- The actual reality of the named action occurs while the purpose is frustrated.
- Both the outward form of the action and the purpose occur.
- The purpose occurs while the named action does not take place.
- Neither the action nor the purpose occurs.
He concludes that perjury or the breach of an oath (hinth) is legally established exclusively in the first scenario . To substantiate his points, he engages extensively with the chapter on oaths in bargaining from the Jami al-Kabir of Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani, drawing on Sadr al-Din al-Khilati's abridgment and its commentary, Tuhfat al-Haris, by Ala al-Din Ali ibn Balban al-Farisi .
Reception and Transmission
Ibn Abidin incorporated a summary of this treatise and its conclusions into his principal legal commentary, Radd al-Muhtar ala al-Durr al-Mukhtar, advising readers seeking further depth to refer directly to the monograph .
The work is counted as the thirteenth treatise in the author's collected compendium, Majmu'at Rasa'il Ibn Abidin . It was published in Damascus in 1302 AH (1885 CE) as an independent nineteen-page booklet, and has appeared in standard editions of his collected treatises .
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